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rom 1995 to early 2002, the dollar rose by a
trade-weighted average of about 40 percent.
Largely as a result, the US current account deficit
grew by an average of about $75 billion annually for
ten years. It exceeded $800 billion and 6 percent of
GDP in 2006. There were two major consequences
for the world economy.
The first is the risk of international financial instabil-
ity and economic turndown. To finance both its cur-
rent account deficit and its own large foreign invest-
ments, the United States must attract about $7 bil-
lion of foreign capital every working day.Any signif-
icant shortfall from that level of foreign demand for
dollars would drive the exchange rate down and US
inflation and interest rates up. A drying up of that
demand, and especially any net disinvestment from
the $20 trillion or so of existing dollar assets held
around the world, would trigger even larger changes
in these critical prices (and thus in the equity and
housing markets as well).With the US economy near
full employment, but also having slowed, and with
housing already under intense pressure, the result
would be stagflation at best and perhaps a nasty
recession. Other countries would be affected severe-
ly as well, as their currencies rose and they experi-
enced significant reductions in the trade surpluses on
which their growth now depends.
Second is the domestic political risk of trade restric-
tions in the United States and thus disruption of the
global trading system. Dollar overvaluation and the
resulting external deficits are historically the most
accurate leading indicators of US protectionism
because they drastically alter the domestic politics of
the issue, adding to the pressures for new distortions
and weakening pro-trade forces. These traditional
factors are particularly toxic in the current context of
strong anti-globalization sentiments. The spate of
administrative actions against China over the past
several years,and the numerous anti-China bills now
under active consideration by the Congress, demon-
strate the point graphically since China is by far the
largest surplus country and its currency is so dramat-
ically undervalued.
The US current account deficit does not have to be
eliminated. It needs to be cut roughly in half, how-
ever, to stabilize the ratio of US foreign debt to
GDP.When the deficit peaked in 2006,the ratio was
on an explosive path that would exceed 50 percent
within the next few years and an unprecedented
80 percent or so in ten years. Avoiding such out-
comes requires improvement of about $400 billion
from those levels.
I and colleagues at our Peterson Institute for
International Economics have been pointing to
these dangers,and calling for corrective action since
the end of the 1990s.The adjustment process began
in early 2002. The dollar has declined, in a gradual
and orderly manner, by 20 to 25 percent since that
time as the needed capital inflows have been
obtained only through additional price induce-
ments from a cheaper exchange rate and higher
interest rates (and, until recently, higher equity and
housing prices due to strong US growth).The bud-
get deficit has also fallen over the past three years,
limiting the saving shortfall that forces the United
States to borrow so heavily abroad. US growth has
slowed while expansions have accelerated in
Europe, Japan and (even further) in China and
most of the oil producers.
The adjustment to date, however, has been inade-
quate and unbalanced. It has halted the deteriora-
tion of the US deficit, which is no mean feat since
imports came to exceed exports by more than
50 percent,but has not yet convincingly reversed the
trend.The surpluses of the largest creditor countries,
Japan and especially China, continue to soar to
record levels.
An important reason for the inadequate size of
the adjustment is its skewed geographical compo-
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sterling, Swiss franc), Canada, Australia, Korea
and a couple of other Asians have risen by 30 to
50 percent against the dollar. However, the heavi-
ly managed currencies in much of emerging Asia
and the yen, due mainly to Japan’s extremely low
interest rates, have appreciated by modest
amounts if at all.The same is true for most of the
large oil exporters.Hence the improvement of the
US imbalance against Europe has been offset by
continued deterioration against the Asians, much
of which shows up as occurring with China due to
its central role as the final assembly point for
Asia-wide production networks, and the energy
producers.
Unless all economic history is repealed, further
adjustment of these global imbalances is inevitable.
The key question is whether it will occur wholly
through market forces, including the “political mar-
ket” for trade protection, or at least partly through
preemptive policy actions by the major countries.
The impact on global growth, international financial
stability and the world trading system could turn
importantly on which path is followed.
Either path will have to include a further decline of
ten percent or so in the trade-weighted average of
the dollar.There are two main risks in relying sole-
ly on the market for this outcome. One is the possi-
bility of a hard landing if the dollar falls abruptly
rather than in an orderly manner, especially as it
can easily overshoot its needed correction (perhaps
by a substantial amount). This risk is considerably
greater than five years ago: the US external financ-
ing requirement is much larger,US net foreign debt
is headed into uncharted territory, US full employ-
ment means that a dollar plunge would now lead to
much more inflation and much higher interest rates,
and the maturation of the euro offers a real alter-
native to the dollar so there is now “some place else
to put the money”.There are any number of poten-
tial triggers for a precipitous decline in the dollar
including a sharp fall in US interest rates in re-
sponse to the present liquidity difficulties, a US
recession while the rest of the world keeps growing,
diversification out of the dollar by one or more
large sovereign wealth funds (or even rumors
thereof), a drop in the rapid US productivity
growth of the past decade, protectionist legislation
and the 2008 elections as well as a generalized col-
lapse of confidence due to the spillover from the
subprime lending crisis.
The other risk of relying solely on the market is that
the floating currencies (once more excluding the
yen?), which have already largely adjusted, will once
again experience most of the counterpart apprecia-
tions against the dollar decline because the countries
that aggressively manage their exchange rates con-
tinue to block their essential contribution to the
adjustment.This especially means China, because its
surplus is so large and its exchange rate is so key to
others in its region, but also a number of other East
Asians and oil producers including Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan and
several Gulf exporters.
The next big currency move, which could exacerbate
rather than correct the global imbalances, could in
fact be an even more dramatic rise in the euro.
European growth has accelerated relative to US
growth. Euroland interest rates have been rising
while US rates are falling. The euro is moving up
alongside the dollar as a global currency and portfo-
lios around the world, both private and official, are
likely to adjust considerably as a result. Diversifica-
tion from dollars into euros by a number of emerg-
ing economies that have accumulated large reserves,
including via their sovereign wealth funds,intensifies
this prospect.The euro (and the Canadian dollar and
a few other floating currencies) could become sub-
stantially overvalued, especially against the Asians,
weakening their economies and creating protection-
ist spillovers that add to the threat to the global trad-
ing system.
An alternative strategy for completing the global
adjustment through constructive policy actions by
the key countries was recently developed at a con-
ference of thirty top international economists hosted
by our Peterson Institute for International Eco-
nomics and co-sponsored by leading think tanks
from Asia and Europe, the Korea Institute for In-
ternational Economic Policy and BRUEGEL. It
would have four key components:
• attainment of modest budget surpluses in the
United States, as needed for purely domestic rea-
sons and as actually achieved during 1998-2001,to
make room for the needed improvement in the
external balance without generating higher infla-
tion and interest rates;
• aggressive expansion of domestic demand in
East Asia, especially in China and Japan, to off-
set the essential large cutbacks in their trade sur-
pluses;
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• continued rapid growth of domestic demand in
key oil exporting countries; and
• a series of substantial exchange rate changes,
especially by countries that have not yet partici-
pated in the adjustment package.
The Chinese renminbi needs to rise by about 30 per-
cent against the dollar,over a period of three to four
years, with a “down payment” of at least 10 percent
each in the near term. This will require China to
sharply scale back its intervention to block the ren-
minbi appreciation. The yen needs to rise by 10 to
20 percent against the dollar, which may require
Japan to signal (perhaps through intervention) a
desire to strengthen its currency. The other surplus
countries cited above must also limit their market
intervention and allow their currencies to appreciate
substantially. It will be much easier for the other
Asians to do so once China and Japan take the lead,
and all these currencies will rise much less on a
trade-weighted average than against the dollar if
they move together. Euroland, Korea and a few
other floaters must accept further rises in their
exchange rates against the dollar but, because of the
much larger increases in the surplus country curren-
cies, without appreciation of their trade-weighted
averages.
In the 1980s, the US Government and the G-5 aban-
doned their benign neglect of problems very similar
to those we now face in the nick of time to head off
major disruption of the international monetary sys-
tem, world trade and the global economy. Similar
statesmanship is sorely needed again today to
enhance the odds that the inevitable correction will
take place constructively and to avoid the enormous
risks to all involved from letting nature take its
course.